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ABSTRACT 
Motivated disbelief in immigration policy: 
When disagreeing with the solution means denying the problem 
 
by 
 
Jacob S. Brookfield 
 
The motivation to be competent and correct in one’s beliefs has been investigated in 
empirical research looking at the psychological biases that occur when individuals attempt to 
explain why their beliefs are correct, despite the presence of evidence that contradicts that. In 
two studies, I examine one form of these phenomena, motivated disbelief, in the novel 
domain of immigration policy. After reading a passage on the types of harm that 
undocumented immigrants experience in U.S., politically conservative participants who read 
about a proposed immigration policy that was incongruent with their ideology minimized the 
extent to which they perceived injured undocumented workers as neglected relative to 
conservative participants who read about a more ideologically-congruent policy (study 1). 
Similarly, conservative participants who showed low support for a given policy minimized 
the extent to which they perceived neglect toward undocumented workers and the extent to 
which undocumented workers experience wage theft (study 2). These studies provide first 
steps toward unpacking the phenomenon of motivated disbelief within a complex societal 
issue with multiple groups of people involved (i.e., liberals, conservatives, immigrants). 
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Future work will investigate ways to disrupt these biases in order to better understand the 
process of their occurrence.
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Motivated disbelief in immigration policy: 
When disagreeing with the solution means denying the problem  
Intergroup conflict can have deadly consequences if not resolved (Buzan & Waever, 2003). 
History and empirical evidence suggest, though, that compromise between groups is difficult 
to achieve, particularly when the conflicts are long-standing and violent with a historical 
basis (Diehl, Reifschneider, & Hensel, 1996; Ross & Stillinger, 1991). Lay theory says that if 
individuals in conflict can just come to a compromise on the objective content of proposed 
solutions, then peace can be achieved. However, the content of the proposed solutions for 
conflicts are not always evaluated objectively by the individuals in those conflicts. 
Psychological self- and group- biases can act as barriers to conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2000; 
Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). That is, individuals may disagree with proposed policies not only 
due to their disagreement with the objective facts of the policies, but because the individuals 
select and  interpret the content of the policies in order to match with or justify their stance or 
ideology. Even more, the perception of the solutions may not be the only important factor 
related to compromise that is perceptually skewed due to these biases. The specific 
“problems” or issues associated with the conflict may be seen in a biased manner when the 
proposed solutions for those problems are unfavorable to one’s beliefs. This phenomenon of 
solution aversion has been examined in the domain of climate change and home intruder 
violence (Campbell & Kay, 2014) with the conclusion that individuals view the world and its 
problems as consistent or supportive of our beliefs, because they must be able to rationalize 
their beliefs. 
 In the following section, I will review the literature on motivated reasoning and 
specifically, motivated disbelief. Solution aversion, which is a case of motivated disbelief, 
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has yet to be examined within a complex domain that involves more than two opposing 
groups. Given this, I will then describe two studies which I conducted aimed at examining 
solution aversion in the domain of immigration policy (study 1) and solution support as a 
possible moderator of the effect (study 2). 
Motivated reasoning 
 Individuals typically believe that their reasons for holding the beliefs that they do, are 
objective (Ross & Ward, 1995). They see the evidence that they have collected, which 
supports their prior formed hypotheses, as the correct and objective evidence despite a 
number of psychological biases influencing the way that they pay attention to and interpret 
the possible spectrum of evidence. An example of one such psychological bias is reactive 
devaluation (Ross, 1995), where upon learning that a proposed solution for a problem comes 
from an undesirable party, the individual undermines or devalues the proposal by seeing it as 
biased and unfavorable. In general, this phenomena of building a reasoning to support a held 
belief is called motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Reactive devaluation is just one example 
of a number ways in which individuals go about collecting and interpreting information in a 
biased manner that favors a prior held belief. Not only might these psychological biases be 
keeping individuals from properly accessing or interpreting objective information, but they 
also might be strengthening the positions that individuals already hold (Munro & Ditto, 1997; 
Lord, Lepper, & Ross, 1979). 
 Individuals’ attention toward particular evidence is affected by motivated reasoning 
such that information that serves to backup a prior held hypothesis is more easily noticed and 
given more weight, while evidence that disconfirms prior held hypotheses are given less 
weight and seen as less convincing (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). Aside from differential attention, 
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disconfirming evidence is treated more suspiciously by individuals (Lord, Lepper, & Ross, 
1979). Evidence that is seen as confirming an individual’s attitude or evaluation is taken at 
“face value”, while disconfirming evidence is treated more suspiciously and may even be 
denied. When presented with both pro- and anti-capital punishment articles (i.e., all 
participants were given the same information from both sides of the argument), participants 
rated the article that supported their prior-held view as more convincing (Lord, Lepper, & 
Ross, 1979). As a result of this effect, individuals actually grew further apart in their capital 
punishment attitudes. The importance of this line of research is not only in the existence of 
biased attention and interpretation of the evidence, but also of the outcome: increased 
polarization between groups even when all parties are given identical information. 
 As briefly described above, reactive devaluation has an important impact on 
intergroup conflict through changes in the interpretation of evidence for proposed solutions 
to conflict. The favorability of negotiation offers is diminished by the knowledge that its 
origin is from the adversary (Ross, 1995). Importantly for the current research, reactive 
devaluation not only occurs between large groups, but also within groups, based on 
ideological differences (Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002). Specifically, individuals on both 
sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict derogated the same proposal whether it was actually 
proposed by their side or the opposing side, when it was described as originating from the 
opposing side (Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002). This effect occurred across Israeli-Arab 
group boundaries, but also within the Israeli group, as a function of whether the proposal was 
from ideological “hawks” (i.e., conservative-leaning) or ideological “doves” (i.e., liberal-
leaning). 
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 Proposed solutions can not only be differentially favored based on who proposes 
them, but can be evaluated based on the actual content of the solutions and how well they 
match with their prior held ideologies. Even more, the conflict-related problems themselves 
can be evaluated differentially based on whether the proposed solutions are congruent or 
incongruent with one’s ideological stance. For example, if an individual dislikes a particular 
proposed climate change policy because the content of the policy conflicts with their 
ideology, then that individual may be more likely to minimize or even deny the existence of 
climate change. In recent work, researchers have examined this phenomena—named solution 
aversion--in which  ideological disagreement with proposed solutions may lead to the 
minimization or even the denial of the problem for which the solution was proposed. That is, 
the perception of societal problems are, in part, a function of one’s level of ideological 
congruence with the proposed solution for that societal problem. Individuals may minimize 
(or even deny—such as in the case of climate change) a societal problem if the solution that 
has been proposed for that problem is ideologically undesired (Campbell & Kay, 2014). 
Participants who read about the problem of climate change were more likely to minimize the 
extent of the climate change problem when their prior-held beliefs were inconsistent, as 
opposed to consistent, with a proposed solution as  (e.g., conservatives reading about a 
climate change tax solution vs. a pro-business solution; Campbell & Kay, 2014). Climate 
change, while an interesting and important societal problem, is an issue that is fairly 
straightforward in terms of individual beliefs regarding the existence of the problem. An 
individual either believes that the Earth is warming or not. In the current research, I wish to 
examine this phenomena of solution aversion (i.e., motivated disbelief) in the context of a 
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more complex societal issue with the hopes of demonstrating it’s influence even when the 
problem is much less clear. 
 In two studies, I hope to bring the phenomenon of solution aversion into a new and 
complex domain—undocumented immigration—and investigate potential moderators of this 
effect. Undocumented immigration is a complex issue precisely because it involves multiple 
parties (immigrants, citizens) and multiple potential problems (e.g., economy, safety, culture, 
wellbeing of citizens and immigrants). With such an issue, it may be more difficult to capture 
whether proposed policies impact views of the problem of undocumented immigration, 
because not everyone agrees on what the problem is. In this paper I aim to examine the 
influence of policy support on views of the problem by holding the problem constant and 
manipulating the proposed solutions. I do this in hopes that this will shed light on whether 
this phenomena does indeed occur in a wider range of issues than has previously been 
studied. Specifically, in study 1, policy proposal will be manipulated to be either stringent 
(i.e., conservative friendly) or lenient (i.e., not conservative friendly) and perceptions of the 
problem of immigrant harm will be assessed. In study 2, policy will again be manipulated, 
but with the goal of examining a moderator of the solution aversion effect: policy support. 
Study 1 
 The intention of this study is to replicate the solution aversion effect within the 
domain of immigration policy in the United States as well as breakdown further how the 
solution aversion affect manifests in a domain that is more complex than the previously 
studied domains of climate change or home intruder violence where multiple groups of 
people (liberals, conservatives, and immigrants) are all subject to perceived gains and losses. 
The aim of the current study is to examine the circumstances under which individuals exhibit 
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motivated disbelief in a societal problem, but because different groups of people (e.g., 
liberals and conservatives) see different “problems” associated with immigration, the current 
study will manipulate the solution while holding the problem constant. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 56 UCSB undergraduates. Six participants were excluded from all 
analyses for self-reporting as non-US citizens and therefore 50 participants remained. The 
sample was 64% female (n =32) with a mean age of 19.3 years (SD = 1.03). The ethnicity of 
the sample was fairly mixed (20 Hispanic, 17 White, 7 Asian, 4 African-American, and 2 
Other). Three measures of political orientation were obtained (General, Economic, and 
Social) and were all measured using a 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) likert scale. 
The sample was fairly socially liberal (M = 2.78, SD  = 1.39), but economically moderate (M 
= 4.02, SD = 1.57), while the average general political orientation reported was slightly 
liberal (M = 3.54, SD = 1.37). 
Measures 
 For the purposes of correlational analyses, various measures that were expected to be 
related to the variables of interest were collected. See Table 1 for correlational analyses. 
 Perceived vulnerability of undocumented immigrants (α = .843) was measured using 
a 12 -item self-report scale with responses ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Higher numbers on this scale represent greater levels of perceived vulnerability of 
undocumented immigrants and included items such as “Undocumented immigrants are 
victims” and “I worry about the abuse of undocumented immigrants.” It is important to note 
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that while this scale has not been previously validated, the Cronbach Alpha level of .843 is 
reasonable. See Appendix A for scale items. 
 Perceived realistic threat of undocumented immigrants was measured using 7-item 
self-report scale with responses ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree) with 
greater values signifying greater perceived realistic (i.e., resource based) threat from 
undocumented immigrants (α = .811; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). 
 Perceived symbolic threat of undocumented immigrants was measured using a 7-item 
self-report scale with responses ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree) with 
greater values signifying greater perceived symbolic (i.e., cultural) threat from 
undocumented immigrants (α = .515; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). Although the 
Cronbach’s Alpha for symbolic threat low, it was still included in the correlational analyses, 
which will not be discussed further. 
Procedures 
 Participants were greeted by a researcher as they came into the laboratory, which 
contained three computers. Each participant sat at their own computer and each experimental 
session contained between one and three participants. Participants completed the entire study 
at their own individual computer. First, all participants read an article describing the problem 
of harm to undocumented immigrant workers. Within that article, two statistics from within 
“the last year” were presented to participants: 1) 63% of injured undocumented workers had 
received little or no care for their injuries and 2) 40% of undocumented workers had reported 
experiencing wage theft.  
 Participants were then randomly assigned to either read a lenient or stringent 
ostensible policy proposal formed by a bi-partisan committee within congress. The lenient 
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proposal described a legalization policy with the option of citizenship, but had very few 
stipulations (e.g., a physical test; will not be deported if they commit small crimes), and 
included a 25% increase to border patrol funding to go toward making the detention centers 
more humane and increasing water supply centers in the deserts along the border. This was 
designed to be a liberal-friendly policy, but disliked by conservatives. The stringent 
condition also included a legalization policy with the option of citizenship, but had more 
strict stipulations (e.g., physical test; drug screening; background check; deportation with 
even the smallest crime) and included a 25% increase to border patrol funding to go toward 
increasing the security force at the border. This proposed policy was designed to be a 
conservative-friendly policy, but not necessarily a policy that goes against liberal beliefs. 
 Participants were then asked to think back to the passage about immigrant harm and 
report how much harm they thought was happening to immigrants. Specifically, they were 
asked to report the percent of injured undocumented workers that they thought did not 
receive proper care (with a reminder that the experts said 63%) and the percent of 
undocumented workers that have experienced wage theft (with a reminder that the experts 
said 40%). Participants then self-reported demographics, including political orientation, and 
were debriefed.  
Results 
 In order to assess whether perceptions of a societal problem are influenced by policy 
support for the proposed solution for that problem, a multiple regression analysis was 
conducted for each of the two “problem” dependent variables: 1) perceptions of personal 
injury to immigrant workers and 2) perceptions of immigrant worker wage theft. The 
predictor variables were solution condition (stringent vs. lenient), political orientation 
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(continuous), and the interaction between condition and political orientation. In order to 
accurately interpret main effects, condition was contrast coded (stringent = +1, lenient = –1) 
and political orientation was mean centered. 
 In these analyses, we used economic political orientation rather than general political 
orientation, because 1) we were using a student population whose mean was well below the 
midpoint on the general political orientation scale and 2) because the mean level of economic 
political orientation was approximately at the midpoint of the scale giving us the range 
necessary to be able to make comparisons between liberals and conservatives, rather than 
between liberals and moderates as would have been the case had we used general political 
orientation. 
Perceptions of personal injury to undocumented workers 
 There was no main effect of condition (B = 1.77, SE = 1.57, t(46)= 1.13, p = .265, 
CI[-1.39, 4.93]). There was a marginal main effect of economic political orientation (B = -
1.97, SE = 1.02, t(46)= -1.94, p = .059, CI[-4.02, .07]), such that across conditions, greater 
economic conservatism was related to lower perceptions of immigrants workers as being 
harmed. 
 The predicted interaction between condition and political orientation was significant 
(B = -3.02, SE = 1.02, t(46)= 2.97, p = .005, CI[.97, 5.06]). In order to interpret this 
interaction, simple slopes were examined (see Figure 1 for predicted means). First, main 
effects for political orientation within each condition were examined. Within the stringent 
condition, political orientation had no effect on the dependent variable (B = 1.05, SE = 1.35, 
t(46) = .78, p = .44, CI[-1.67, 3.77]). However, within the lenient condition, economic 
conservatism predicted lower perceptions of immigrant workers as personally harmed (B = -
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4.99, SE = 1.52, t(46)= -3.29, p = .002, CI[-8.04, -1.93]). Finally, in order to compare the 
impact of the condition at various levels of political orientation, a simple slopes analysis for 
the main effect of condition was conducted at one standard deviation below (i.e., liberals) 
and one standard deviation above (i.e., conservatives) the mean on political orientation. For 
liberals (–1SD), the effect of the condition was not significant (B = -2.97, SE = 2.26, t(46) = -
1.31, p = .196, CI[-7.53,1.58]). For conservatives, however, those who read the stringent 
policy had greater perceptions of personal injury to undocumented workers than did those 
who read the lenient policy (B = 6.51, SE = 2.21, t(46) =  2.94, p = .005, CI[2.06, 10.96]). 
Together, these simple slopes analyses suggest that the marginal main effect of condition was 
driven by conservatives who read the lenient condition. 
 The same multiple regression model was then used to analyze a different dependent 
variable: perceptions of undocumented immigrant workers who have experienced wage theft 
in the last year. 
Perceptions of undocumented worker wage theft 
 There were no main effects of condition (B = .121, SE = 2.11, t(46) = .06, p = .96, 
CI[-4.13, 4.37]) or political orientation (B = -2.13, SE = 1.37, t(46) = -1.56, p = .13, CI[-4.88, 
.622]). Additionally, the predicted interaction between condition and political orientation was 
not significant (B = .331, SE = 1.37, t(46) = .24, p = .81, CI[-2.42, 3.08]). 
Discussion 
 Using a relatively small sample size, the current study replicated past work in a novel 
domain by showing that conservatives minimized the problem of immigrant harm (i.e., 
percent of injured undocumented workers who go with little or no care for their injuries) after 
reading a proposal that was incongruent with their ideology as opposed to when they read a 
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proposal that was congruent with their ideology. This suggests that solution aversion can 
occur in a domain that involves multiple groups that stand to gain or lose resources and 
power. Additionally, the results suggest that the differences in people’s perception of societal 
problems may, partially, be a function of the proposed policies that are being openly 
discussed and not simply a matter of objectively agreeing or disagreeing with the extent of 
the problem. 
 The expected results were found on one of the two dependent variables. It may be that 
thinking about personal injury is simply more accessible than thinking about wage theft. That 
is, perceptions of personal injury, as opposed to wage theft, may evoke more polarization 
between groups based on the solution aversion effect, because it is more relevant to people’s 
lives and it may be more easy to think about the consequences.  
 Another possible explanation for not finding solution aversion effects on the wage 
theft outcome is that the underlying assumption in the manipulation is that conservatives 
would support the stringent policy more than the lenient policy. In study 2, policy support 
will be examined directly to see the impact that it has on motivated disbelief in the problem 
of immigration. That is, policy support will be examined as a potential moderator of the 
solution aversion effect. It may be that it is not sufficient to assume that certain groups will 
support particular ideologically-congruent policies, but rather it may be that this is a factor 
that needs to be taken into consideration when trying to predict beliefs about societal 
problems. 
Study 2  
 Study 1 replicated the solution aversion effect in a novel domain, immigration policy, 
and showed that even complex societal issues with multiple parties involved can contain 
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motivated disbelief. In study 2, I will attempt to replicate this finding with a non-
undergraduate sample and explore a possible moderator of this effect. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 245 workers using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Two non-US participants were excluded from all analyses, 
leaving 243 participants in the sample. The sample was 47.7% female (n = 116) and 
participant age ranged from 18 to 76 years old with a mean age of 34.5 years (SD = 11.31). 
The ethnic makeup of the sample was 83.5% White, 6.2% Asian, 4.9% Hispanic/Latino, 
4.1% African-American, 1.2% Other. The sample was slightly liberal, both in general 
political orientation (M = 3.57, SD = 1.68) and social political orientation (M = 3.32, SD = 
1.76), and, similar to study 1, was approximately at the midpoint on economic political 
orientation (M = 3.95. SD = 1.73). 
Measures 
 Perceived realistic threat toward undocumented immigrants (α = .912; Stephan, 
Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999) was measured in the same manner as in study 1, as was perceived 
symbolic threat toward undocumented immigrants (α = .819; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 
1999). 
 Perceived vulnerability of undocumented immigrants (α = .915) was measured using 
a 12 -item self-report scale with responses ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Higher numbers on this scale represent greater levels of perceived vulnerability of 
undocumented immigrants and included items such as “Undocumented immigrants are 
victims” and “I worry about the abuse of undocumented immigrants.” It is important to note 
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that while this scale has not been previously validated, the Cronbach Alpha level of .843 is 
reasonable enough to move forward in using it. See Appendix A for scale items. 
 Policy Support was measured using a single item immediately following the 
presentation of the proposed policy by the “ congressional bi-partisan committee” (which of 
course differed in content as a function of condition). The measure asked “To what extent do 
you support the bi-partisan immigration policy that was just presented to you?” and 
responses ranged from 1 (do not support at all) to 7 (strongly support). 
 See Table 2 for correlational analyses. 
Procedure 
 Participants who chose to participate from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk clicked on a 
link which took them to the study. First, all participants read the same article as in study 1 
where the two statistics on undocumented worker harm were presented. Then, participants 
were randomly assigned to read a proposal that was either lenient or stringent. These were 
the same proposals as in study 1. Immediately follow this, participants answered one 
question aimed at assessing their level of support for the policy that they read. 
 Participants then responded to the two dependent variables, which asked participants 
to give their opinion on the two statistics related to undocumented workers harm just as in 
study 1. Participants responded to the realistic and symbolic threat measures which were 
designed to access their self-reported threat levels toward undocumented immigrants. Finally, 
they reported demographics including political orientation. 
Results 
 As in study 1, in order to assess whether perceptions of a societal problem are 
influenced by policy support for the proposed solution for that problem, a multiple regression 
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analysis was conducted for each of the two “problem” dependent variables. The predictor 
variables were once again, solution condition (stringent vs. lenient), political orientation 
(continuous), and the interaction between condition and political orientation. In order to 
accurately interpret main effects, condition was contrast coded (stringent = +1, lenient = –1) 
and political orientation was mean centered. Once again, economic political orientation was 
used rather than general political orientation, because of the mean for economic political 
orientation being approximately at the midpoint of the scale. 
Perceptions of personal injury to undocumented workers 
 There was a significant main effect of political orientation, such that greater levels of 
economic conservatism were associated with reduced perceptions of improper care for 
injured undocumented workers (B = -2.55, SE = .66, t(237) = -3.88, p < .001, CI[-3.85, -
1.26]). There was a marginal main effect of condition, such that those who read the stringent 
proposal had reduced injury perceptions relative to those who read the lenient proposal (B = -
1.97, SE = 1.13, t(237) = -1.74, p = .08, CI[-4.19, .26]). 
 Finally, the predicted interaction between political orientation and condition was not 
significant (B = -.13, SE = .66, t(237) = -.196, p = .84, CI[-1.42, 1.17]). That is, the 
interaction on this dependent variable, which was significant in study 1, did not replicate. 
 The same multiple regression model was used to analyze perceptions of wage theft as 
occurring in the undocumented worker population. 
Perceptions of undocumented worker wage theft 
 There was significant main effect of political orientation, such that greater levels of 
economic conservatism were associated with reduced perceptions of wage theft among 
undocumented workers (B = -1.40, SE = .58, t(237) = -2.42, p < .05, CI[-2.54, -.26]). There 
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was no significant main effect of condition (B = -.91, SE = 1.00, t(237) = -.92, p = .36, CI[-
2.88, 1.05]) and no significant interaction between condition and political orientation (B = 
.20, SE = .58, t(237) = .35, p = .73, CI[-.94, 1.34]). 
 The predicted interaction did not replicate from study 1, so in order to more directly 
examine the potentially moderating impact of policy support on solution aversion, 
differences in policy support were examined, followed by policy support as a moderator. 
This was done to examine differences in policy support between liberals and conservatives to 
see if the assumption that conservatives supported the stringent condition more than the 
liberals was indeed existent. 
Support for policies 
 In order to assess the assumption that conservatives support the stringent policy more 
than liberals and more than the lenient policy, policy support was regressed onto condition 
(stringent vs. lenient), economic political orientation (continuous), and the interaction 
between condition and economic political orientation. Once again, condition was contrast 
coded (stringent = +1, lenient = –1) and economic political orientation was mean centered. 
 There was a significant main effect of political orientation, such that greater 
economic conservatism was associated with lower levels of policy support, across conditions 
(B = -.23, SE = .06, t(237) = -3.77, p < .001, CI[-.35, -.11]). There was no main effect of 
condition (B = .01, SE = .11, t(237) = .05, p = .96, CI[-.20, .21]).  
 There was a significant interaction between condition and political orientation (B = 
.29, SE = .06, t(237) = 4.64, p < .001, CI[.16, .41]).  In order to interpret this interaction, 
simple slope analyses were assessed (See Figure 2 for predicted means).Within the lenient 
condition there was a significant effect of political orientation where economic conservatism 
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was negatively associated with policy support (B = -.52, SE = .08, t(237) = 6.31, p < .001, 
CI[-.68, -.36]), whereas in the stringent condition the predicted positive relationship between 
political orientation and policy support was not present (B = .05, SE = .09, t(237) = .58, p = 
.56, CI[-.13, .23]). That is, there was no effect of political orientation on support for the 
stringent policy.  
 Because the assumption in the first set of analyses was that conservatives would 
support the stringent--and liberals the lenient--policy more than the other group and this was 
found not to be the case, I examined the predicted two-way interaction at various levels of 
support. That is, I regressed perceptions of the problem of immigration onto condition 
(stringent vs lenient), political orientation (continuous), and policy support (continuous) with 
all possible 2-way interactions and the 3-way interaction included in the model. 
 Because only the 3-way interaction between condition, political orientation, and 
policy support was all that was of interest, that is all that has been reported here. The 
predicted 3-way interaction was significant for both the “injury” outcome variable (B = .82, 
SE = .38, t(233) = 2.15, p < .05, CI[.07, 1.56]) and for the “wage” outcome variable (B = .86, 
SE = .33, t(233) = 2.59, p < .05, CI[.21, 1.51]). In order to interpret this 3-way interaction, 
simple slope analyses were conducted. 
Simple slope analyses 
 Within the lenient policy condition, the two-way interaction between economic 
political orientation and policy support was not significant for either the “injury” outcome 
variable (B = .01 SE = .46, t(233) = 0.02, p = .98, CI[-.90, .92]) or the “wage” outcome 
variable (B = -.63, SE = .40, t(233) = -1.55, p = .12, CI[-1.42, .17]). However, within the 
stringent policy condition, the same interaction was significant for both the “injury” outcome 
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variable (B = 1.64, SE = .60, t(233) = 2.73, p < .01, CI[.46, 2.83]) and the “wage” outcome 
variable (B = 1.09, SE = .53, t(233) = 2.07, p < .05, CI[.05, 2.13]). These results suggest that 
within the stringent policy condition, support had an impact on the outcome variables 
differently for liberals and conservatives. Indeed, the direction of the predicted means (see 
Figures 3a through 4b) is such that conservatives with low support for the stringent policy 
minimize the problem of immigrant harm relative to conservatives with high support. 
Liberals, on the other hand were relatively unaffected by stringent policy support in terms of 
the impact it has on their perceptions of immigrant harm. 
 To further unpack this 3-way interaction, the simple effect of support was examined 
for liberals (-1SD on political conservatism) within the lenient condition and conservatives 
(+1SD on political conservatism) within the stringent condition. Doing this holds constant 
the holds constant the match between ideology and policy that was simply assumed in study 
1. This will allow for the direct examination of the impact of policy support on perceptions of 
immigrant harm when participants read about the policy that matches with their larger 
ideological group (i.e., liberals or democrats). 
 In order to investigate the impact of policy support under these conditions, the same 
three way interaction model was run, except simple slopes for policy support were assessed 
in two different ways. For the first analysis, the effect of policy support was examined for 
liberals (-1SD on political conservatism) in the lenient condition. This effect was not 
significant for the “injury” outcome variable (B = 2.13, SE = 1.50, t(233) = 1.42, p = .16, CI[-
.83, 5.07]), but significant for the “wage theft” outcome variable (B = 3.81, SE = 1.31, t(233) 
= 2.91, p < .01, CI[1.23, 6.39]). Although the simple slope for support was not significant for 
the “injury” it trended positively just as it did for the “wage theft” variable. This suggests that 
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for liberals reading about an ideologically consistent policy, higher policy support was 
related to perceptions of greater immigrant harm. That is, even within liberals who were 
expected to support the lenient policy, low policy support led to a minimization effect.  
 For the second analysis, the effect of policy support was examined for conservatives 
(+1SD on political conservatism) in the stringent condition. This effect was significant and 
positive for both the “injury” outcome variable (B = 5.14, SE = 1.53, t(233) = 3.36, p < .01, 
CI[2.18, 8.16]). and the “wage theft” outcome variable (B = 4.27, SE = 1.34, t(233) = 3.18, p 
< .01, CI[1.63, 6.91]). This suggests that for conservatives who read an ideologically 
consistent policy, higher policy support was related to greater perceptions of immigrant 
harm. This was consistent with the hypothesized direction and suggests that policy support is 
an important variable to consider when examining motivated disbelief. Minimization of 
immigrant harm after reading an ideologically opposed policy, in this case, only occurred for 
conservatives who actually had low support for the policy. 
Discussion 
 In two studies, I demonstrated that solution aversion, as a proxy for motivated 
reasoning, is a complex phenomenon that may not transfer easily into all domains. In study 1, 
I replicated the solution aversion effect in a new domain: undocumented immigration. 
Conservatives who were ideologically opposed to a lenient proposed policy minimized the 
problem of injured undocumented worker neglect relative to conservatives who read a more 
stringent proposed policy. Liberals’ perceptions of the problem were not impacted by 
solution condition. 
 In study 2, the solution aversion effect failed to replicate, but the results suggest that 
within a complex topic such as immigration policy, individual policy support may need to be 
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considered. As the complexity of the issue increases individuals may be more likely to be 
opposed to solutions for any number of reasons—not just due to ideological inconsistency. 
For example, conservatives may be opposed to a policy because it’s too liberal (i.e., they are 
ideologically opposed to it) or because they feel that it lacks something important (i.e., they 
are opposed to it based on the content). Indeed, once policy support was taken into account, a 
variation of the solution aversion effect was found. That is, conservatives who had low levels 
of support for the stringent policy minimized the problem of injured undocumented worker 
neglect and undocumented worker wage theft. This effect was not found in the lenient policy, 
so it may be that congruency between ideology and policy is a necessary, but not sufficient 
component of the solution aversion effect. That is, only conservatives who were both 
ideologically opposed and had low policy support showed a pattern suggestive of solution 
aversion. Additionally, the effect may not have been found in the lenient condition, because 
the focus of that policy was on taking care of undocumented immigrants, as opposed to the 
stringent condition which may have primed worries about security. 
 The minimization or even denial of societal problems is not a new phenomenon, 
however, the understanding of why this phenomenon occurs is still yet to be fully 
understood. Motivated disbelief that occurs, in particular despite clear scientific opinion, 
presents an interesting motivational question: How far will people adjust their perceptions of 
the evidence to either confirm their prior held belief (i.e., motivated reasoning more 
generally) or avoid the implementation of an undesired outcome (i.e., motivated disbelief)? 
In these studies, I took steps to unpack motivated disbelief in a domain that involves multiple 
parties and multiple possible solutions and showed that in order to disentangle ideological 
support from general support it may be important to measure both in future studies. 
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Specifically, because immigration involves multiple parties and potential problems, it is not 
always clear what the “problem” is if it is brought up as a general discussion. For issues that 
require more cognitive work or have conflicting motives (such as caring for immigrants and 
caring for US citizens) it may require not just ideological incongruence with a policy, but 
also explicitly low policy support, in order to engage in the motivated disbelief that occurs as 
a function of solution aversion. More concisely, as the complexity of societal issues 
increases, the stronger the beliefs of the individual may need to be before they are motivated 
to engage in problem disbelief. 
 An alternative explanation is that for certain issues such as climate change (e.g., 
Cambpell & Kay, 2014) people may rely almost exclusively on ideological congruency, 
while with other, possibly more complex domains, such as undocumented immigration, 
people may not be entirely clear what their ideological “group” (e.g., conservatives or 
liberals) would believe about the proposed solutions and enhance their possibly vague sense 
of ideological congruency with an explicit lack of support for a particular policy in order to 
be properly motivated to deny evidence. This explanation leaves open the possibility that 
explicit policy support is most important for societal issues that don’t have a clear political 
congruency and that political congruency is the most important factor predicting motivated 
disbelief when political congruency is unambiguous and known. 
 The current set of studies had its limitations. The policy proposals may have not only 
manipulated stringency, as was intended, but may have also had differential priming effects 
in each condition. That is, the stringent condition may have primed the idea of security and 
safety, based on the content of that passage, while the lenient proposal was focused more on 
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immigrant care and human rights. Future studies should disentangle or at least control for 
these effects.  
 While study 2 benefitted from the inclusion of a policy support measure, the measure 
was not specific about why individuals did or did not support the policy they read. Parsing 
out various types of support (ideologically vs. content-based) may be an important factor in 
understand the motivation underlying these effects of motivated disbelief, but also in order to 
understand ways to combat these psychological biases. Being able to find a way to interrupt 
these biased processes may shed light on the motivational reason for their presence. 
 Future work will investigate the mechanisms by which solution aversion occurs. For 
example, it may be the case that individuals feel a threat to their self concept when their 
beliefs are called into question via a proposed policy that they disagree with. Once there is a 
threat to the self-concept present the classic defensive threat responses would be expected to 
occur, including the dismissal or denial of evidence that suggest one is wrong in their beliefs. 
If this was the case then giving a boost to individuals’ self-concept prior to reading about the 
proposed policies may reduce the extent to which they engage in these biases. Finally, future 
work will use the understanding of those mechanisms to build a case for an intervention that 
interrupts the process of solution aversion and allows individuals to reason more objectively 
rather than be selectively guided by prior held beliefs. 
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Table 1 
 
Study 1 correlations 
      
  
Economic 
PO 
Social 
PO 
Wage 
theft 
Personal 
injury 
Vulnerability 
 
Realistic 
Threat 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Political  
Orien. (PO) .666** .630** -.115 -.257† -.479** .445** .284* 
Economic  
PO  .170 -.227 -.242† -.367** .275† .231 
Social 
PO   -.274† -.325* -.352* .297* -.085 
Wage 
theft    .525** .352* -.267† .002 
Personal 
injury     .482** -.314* .105 
Vulnerability      -.768** -.350* 
Realistic 
Threat             .436** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
† Correlation is marginally significant at 0.10 level 
 
Table 2 
 
Study 2 correlations 
       
  
Economic 
PO 
Social 
PO 
Wage 
theft 
Personal 
injury 
Vulnerability 
 
Realistic 
Threat 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Policy 
Support 
Political  
Orien. (PO) .796** .850** -.202** -.269** -.568** .535** .515** -.313** 
Economic  
PO 
 
.680** -.155* -.236** -.507** .503** .455** -.261** 
Social  
PO 
  
-.250** -.310** -.576** .520** .559** -.291** 
Wage  
theft 
   
.510** .345** -.161* -.208** .257** 
Personal 
injury 
    
.393** -.203** -.263** .235** 
Vulnerability 
     
-.740** -.697** .577** 
Realistic 
Threat 
      
.778** -.494** 
Symbolic 
Threat 
       
-.430** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
   
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 1. Perceived percent of injured undocumented workers who receive little or no care 
(study 1) 
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Figure 2. Policy support (study 2) 
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Figure 3a. Perceived percent of injured undocumented workers who receive little or no care 
(within “lenient” condition; study 2) 
 
Figure 3b. Perceived percent of injured undocumented workers who receive little or no care 
(within “stringent” condition; study 2) 
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Figure 4a. Perceived percent of undocumented workers who have experienced wage theft 
(within “lenient” condition; study 2) 
 
Figure 4b. Perceived percent of undocumented workers who have experienced wage theft 
(within “stringent” condition; study 2)  
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Appendix A 
Perceived vulnerability of undocumented immigrants 
Instructions: “We will now ask for your opinion on a few topics related to undocumented 
immigration. Please respond honestly. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers. We 
are simply interested in how you feel about the subject.” 
Response range: 1 (Strongly Disagree) – 7 (Strongly Agree) 
1. Undocumented immigrants have no one to go to for help in a dangerous situation. 
2. Undocumented immigrants experience more dangerous situations than the average American. 
3. Undocumented immigrants are more vulnerable to domestic violence than the average American. 
4. Undocumented immigrants are more vulnerable to employer abuse than the average American. 
5. In the United States, undocumented immigrants have a high risk of being exploited. 
6. In general, undocumented immigrant abuse is rare, so we should not be very worried about it.* 
7. Negative things that happen to undocumented immigrants are probably their own fault.* 
8. I am worried about the abuse of undocumented immigrants. 
9. I am concerned that undocumented immigrants may not be treated as fairly as Americans. 
10. Undocumented immigrants are victims. 
11. Undocumented immigrants do not deserve the same rights as U.S. citizens.* 
12. Undocumented immigrants should not have come into the U.S. if they wanted to be treated well.* 
 
Note: Asterisks (*) signify reverse-scored items 
